Abstract: We investigate systematic changes in banks' projected credit losses between the 2014 and 2016 EBA stress tests, employing methodology from Philippon et al. (2017) . We find that projected credit losses were smoothed across the tests through systematic model adjustments. Those banks whose losses would have increased the most from 2014 to 2016 due to changes in the supervisory scenarios-keeping the models constant and controlling for changes in the riskiness of underlying portfolios-saw the largest decrease in losses due to model changes. Model changes were more pronounced for banks that rely more on the Internal Ratings-Based approach, and they explain the cross-section of market responses to the release of the 2016 results. Stock prices and CDS spreads increased more for banks with larger reductions in projected credit losses due to model changes, as investors apparently did not interpret lower loan losses as reflecting mainly a decrease in credit risk but, instead, as a sign of lower capital requirements going forward.
Introduction
Approaches to stress testing differ across countries, notably between the European Union and the United States. In the EU-wide stress tests that are administered by the European Banking Authority (EBA), each bank builds and runs its own models following a common methodology set by the EBA. The individual banks' quantitative results are published and used by the regulators to evaluate banks' capital needs. In the United States, stress testing under the Dodd Frank Act also consists of bank-internal stress tests but these remain confidential and are, to a large extent, used to assess the quality of banks' risk management. The quantitative assessment of whether banks have enough capital that is made public is based on models that are developed and run by the Federal Reserve following an "industrywide approach, in which the estimated model parameters are the same for all Bank Holding Companies."
1 Discussions between banks and regulators as to the advantages and disadvantages of the various approaching are ongoing.
2
This paper highlights a possible disadvantage associated with supervisors' reliance on bankinternal models for quantitative assessments: The models can be subject to strategic adjustments, meaning banks' internal models are modified each time stress tests are run to reduce losses given the applicable scenarios and exposures. Such "model changes" can be unrelated to the performance of the models in predicting actual loan losses.
To estimate the credit loss models that are run by the banks, the paper follows the methodology in Philippon et al. (2017) . 3 Because the EBA publishes very detailed information on individual banks' hypothetical loan loss rates, it is possible to estimate the relationship between macroeconomic variables and banks' credit losses using regression techniques. The data give individual banks' loss rates by portfolio, country, scenario, and forecast year. Allowing for a country-specific effect of macro variables (GDP growth, inflation rate, unemployment rate) on loan loss rates (that is the same for all banks) and, in turn, a bank-specific effect of macro variables (that is the same across countries) on loss rates, the estimation delivers approximations of banks' underlying credit loss models.
To compare the 2014 and 2016 EBA stress tests, we estimate the banks' credit models separately for the two years. This allows us to decompose changes in credit losses between stress test years. In particular, we separate the effects of changes in banks' credit exposures 1 See page 13 of "Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2017: Supervisory Stress Test Methodology and Results". 2 Covas (2017) argues that letting banks use own models to determine equity payouts will significantly reduce the uncertainty around capital planning, and, therefore, increase efficiency and credit availability.
3 Philippon et al. (2017) evaluate the informational content of and potential biases in the 2014 edition of the EBA stress tests, including a comparison to the 2011 edition. They do not analyze the 2016 edition in contrast to this paper.
from the effects of changes in supervisory macroeconomic scenarios and underlying bank-specific models. This exercise delivers several key results. First, changes in banks' credit exposures from 2013:Q4 to 2015:Q4, the two reference points of the stress test editions, helped lower losses.
Second, the 2016 adverse scenario was less severe than the 2014 adverse scenario. Based on the same credit exposures and the same credit loss models, the 2016 adverse scenario produces lower aggregate losses than the 2014 adverse scenario. Moreover, the increase in losses between the baseline scenario and the adverse scenario is smaller in 2016 compared with the increase in 2014. 4 The third key finding relates to model adjustments. The credit loss models appear to be tailored to each year's scenarios and exposures, that is, the 2014 (2016) models produce lower losses than the 2016 (2014) models with 2014 (2016) exposures and scenarios.
We explore the relationship between exposure, scenario, and model changes further, with a focus on changes at the individual bank level. We find no evidence that scenarios are designed to offset changes in losses resulting from exposure changes. If anything banks that saw their losses increase due to exposure changes also saw their losses increase due to scenario changes.
However, changes in the adverse scenario are correlated with changes in the riskiness of bank portfolios. Banks whose portfolio risk-proxied by risk-weight density-increased more between stress test years saw a relatively milder adverse scenario in 2016 compared with 2014. We conjecture that this is because changes in the adverse scenario are related to changes in countries' macroeconomic conditions. As the economy improves, a constant shock to the baseline scenario implies a milder adverse scenario in absolute terms. At the same time, banks might increase the risk in their portfolios as the economy improves.
We then demonstrate systematic model adjustments. To this end, we compute the losses that each bank would have incurred had it applied the 2014 model in 2016 and vice versa, for the same exposures and scenario. We denote the difference in these losses, which stems from model changes, by Δ . We also calculate the losses that result from the 2014 adverse scenario and, separately, from the 2016 adverse scenario, keeping the model and exposures constant. The difference between these losses, which stems from scenario changes, is denoted by Δ . Relating the estimated changes from model changes with the estimated changes from scenario changes, we find a strong negative correlation. That is, banks whose losses would have increased the most due to scenario changes had they used the 2014 models for the 2016 stress test appear to have adjusted their models the most to lower the losses given the 2016 adverse scenario. Regressing Δ on Δ delivers a coefficient that is significant at the 1 percent level (50 observations).
To assess the quantitative relevance of model changes, we ask how much higher losses would have been in the 2016 stress test had banks used the 2014 models. In this case, losses would have increased on average by an amount equivalent to 1.7 percent of a bank's Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1 capital) in the adverse scenario, with substantial heterogeneity across banks. The 10 banks benefiting the most from model changes would have seen an increase equivalent to an average of 15 percent of their CET1 capital.
The systematic nature of the model changes suggests strategic adjustments. In fact, we control for changes in the riskiness of bank portfolios by including changes in banks' riskweight densities between stress tests in the regressions. Yet, changes in losses from scenario changes, Δ , continue to predict changes in losses from model changes, Δ . We also show that reductions in losses through model changes were more pronounced for larger portfolios, where adjustments have a larger effect on a bank's aggregate credit losses.
Model adjustments might have been helped by two factors. First, banks with a larger share of exposures subject to the Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach saw their credit losses increase more because of exposure and scenario changes. The IRB approach is more amenable to changes since models are more complex, which likely gives banks more flexibility to adjust models under this approach. Second, exposure and scenarios changes affected banks with more realistic models more. These banks might, therefore, have had more room to decrease projected losses than banks whose models vastly underpredicted loss rates. Ultimately, model changes between 2014 and 2016 led to convergence in model performance across banks, that is, the increase in losses from model changes was more pronounced for banks whose models under-predicted credit losses more in 2014. Therefore, the overall power of banks' credit risk models, despite the strategic adjustments, stayed roughly the same and, if anything, improved slightly in 2016.
Separately, we find that for banks with smaller capital buffers model performance improved more between 2014 and 2016 than for better capitalized banks, indicating that supervisors might have scrutinized the models of weaker banks more.
Finally, we look at the informational content of model changes for equity and debt markets in the cross-section of stock prices and Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads. Model changes Δ have predictive power for the cumulative changes in stock prices and CDS spreads on the first two days after the release of the stress test results. The larger the decrease in losses due to model changes was (controlling for changes in risk-weight densities), the higher were abnormal stock returns. European supervisors use stress test results to set regulatory capital requirements for the following year. Thus model changes resulting in lower than expected projected losses came as a positive surprise to equity investors, who consequently anticipated higher dividends and a lower risk of dilution through new equity issuance. Had equity investors taken the lower than expected losses as a sign of reduced credit risk, one should have seen stock prices fall on the news. 5 In line with the response of stock prices, CDS spreads increased more for banks with lower losses due to model changes, with a weaker effect for better capitalized banks. Again, a decrease in projected credit losses was seen as an increase not a decrease in risk, which is supportive of our main finding, that a significant portion of model changes were not related to changes in the riskiness of bank portfolios but instead served to contain and smooth projected credit losses across stress tests.
Literature
Since stress tests are a relatively new addition to the microprudential supervisory toolkit, the literature on stress testing is small but growing. This paper builds on recent work by Philippon et al. (2017) , who analyze the 2011 and 2014 EBA stress tests. The authors find that the stress tests have informational value and report no evidence for biases in the construction of the scenarios or in the estimated losses across banks of different sizes and ownership structures. Reserve appears to bias projected capital ratios upwards to prop up large banks, but downwards to discipline poorly capitalized banks. These biases appear to affect bank behavior: Banks with more positive bias in their reports are less likely to improve capital ratios by raising equity or cutting dividends subsequent to CCAR.
Another strand of the literature has studied the predictability of stress test results. Glasserman and Tangirala (2015) state that, as the CCAR process has evolved, its outcomes have become more predictable. They find that projected stress losses in the 2013 and 2014 stress tests are nearly perfectly correlated for banks that participated in both rounds. Gallardo et al. (2016) An increase in risk is typically good news for equity investors due to their limited liability. So a decrease in the riskiness of a bank's loan portfolio should, if anything, have a negative effect on the bank's stock price.
6 Using different methodology, Flannery et al. (2017) show that U.S. stress tests produce information: Stress test disclosures are associated with significantly higher absolute abnormal returns, as well as higher abnormal trading volume. Similarly, Petrella and Resti (2013) find that the 2011 EBA stress tests produced information, studying the response of stock prices to the publication of the results.
7 Per Covas (2017) though, the disagreement between banks own projections and the Federal Reserves are persistent but only predictable in part.
more sophisticated banks-such as investment, universal, and custodian banks-manage their capital in excess of regulatory minimums more aggressively. In turn, the equity market appears to reward banks' aggressive capital requests, even if they are, at first, rejected by the Federal Reserve.
Several papers have analyzed biases in bank internal risk models. Behn et al. (2016) show that the introduction of model-based capital regulation in Germany biased downward the measurement of credit risk by banks that adopted the model-based approach. In particular, they show that internal risk estimates underpredict actual loan default rates; that both default rates and loss rates are higher for loans that were originated under the model-based approach while the corresponding risk-weights are significantly lower; and that banks that adopted the model-based approach have lower capital charges and, at the same time, experience higher loan losses. They also find that such behavior has real effects. Large banks, the main benefeciaries of the reform, expanded their lending at the expense of smaller banks that did not introduce the model-based approach. The evidence on biases in model outputs is not limited to Europe.
Using U.S. supervisory data on syndicated loans (a subset of corporate loans), Plosser and Santos (2014) show that low-capital banks bias downward their internally-generated risk estimates consistent with an effort to improve their regulatory capital ratios. Begley et al. (2017) analyze bank risk in the trading book of U.S., Canadian and European banks, documenting that a decrease in a bank's equity capital results in less informative self-reported risk measures in the following quarter. Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) also provide evidence for manipulation of risk weights, uncovering that risk-weight density declines after regulators approve a bank's internal model, with stronger effects for banks with weaker capitalization.
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Supervisory stress tests and regulatory risk weights have also been challenged by evidence from market-price-based stress tests introduced in Acharya et al. (2012) . Steffen (2014) and Steffen and Acharya (2014) find that market-based metrics result in substantially higher estimates of capital shortfalls than the ECB results in 2011. In turn, Acharya et al. (2014) 
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While the stress tests are microprudential in nature and have the goal of assessing individual banks' capital adequacy, the results matter for macro-prudential policy as Constancio (2016) emphasizes. The aggregate results are used by the ECB to analyze potential macroeconomic effects of more stringent capital requirements as well as contagion effects across banks, for example. Moreover, the results can feed into analysis of the appropriateness of macroprudential measures. In this regard, the relevance of the stress test goes beyond the microprudential scope.
The Empirical Model

Model equations
This section introduces the methodology used to back out the credit loss models banks employed when projecting credit losses in the EBA stress tests. Following Philippon et al. (2017), we estimate the relationship between macroeconomic variables and banks' projected loan loss rates using a two-step procedure. In the first step, country-specific weights on macroeconomic variables are estimated via OLS:
where is the impairment rate of bank in scenario year of stress test on portfolio in country . x y jt is a vector of macroeconomic variables and are bank-fixed effects.
The estimated weights^associated with the macroeconomic variables are used to compute country-specific macro factors: =^p y j x y jt . These factors enter the regression equation that is estimated in the second step as follows:
is the portfolio-and bank-specific sensitivity of loss rates with respect to the macrofactor in stress test . The model is estimated for the retail and corporate portfolios separately, hence, ∈ {retail, corporate}. To analyze changes in banks' stress test models across years, the twostep procedures is run for the 2014 and the 2016 stress tests separately, hence, ∈ {2014, 2016}.
The macroeconomic variables that enter the regressions are GDP growth, the unemployment rate, and the inflation rate for each country .
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This approach effectively links macroeconomic scenarios to credit loss projections allowing for differences across countries in how macroeconomic variables map into losses. It further allows for differences in the riskiness of bank portfolios and their sensitivities to macro developments, thereby accounting for differences in banks' business models and in the clients they cater to.
In what follows, we will often refer to the terms "model" and "scenario". estimate of the actual models that banks employed in the 2016 stress test. In this paper, we will refer to our estimates of banks' underlying models simply as "model" or "models".
The stress test data are publicly available for a larger number of banks in 2014 compared with 2016. Because we do not want differences in parameter estimates across stress test editions to be driven by changes in the underlying sample of banks, we estimate the 2014 and 2016 models on the same sample of 50 banks. 
Estimation results
Weights on macro variables Results from the first-stage regressions are presented in figure   1 . In each of the three panels, the country-specific coefficients^obtained from the 2014 data are plotted against those resulting from the 2016 data. The left (middle) panel shows the coefficients for GDP growth (the unemployment rate). The right panel is for the inflation rate.
All panels also show the 45-degree line. Table 1 gives summary statistics of the coefficients.
As expected GDP growth has a negative effect on loss rates while the unemployment rate has a positive effect. The effect of the inflation rate is more mixed. In the 2016 model, the unemployment rate has, on average, a larger weight than in the 2014 model, while GDP growth has a lower weight.
Banks' s The bank-specific sensitivities to the macro factors obtained from the second-stage estimation are presented in figure 2. As can also be seen from the last two rows of table 1, there is substantial variation in bank-specific s across banks. the average is close to 1 by construction, but the standard deviation is relatively high at 0.53 in 2016 and 0.73 in 2014.
Model fit
The fit of the model in terms of the 2 , shown in table 2, is good, ranging between 53 and 65 percent depending on the stress test year and the portfolio. The 2 displayed in the third line of the table, which is for the 2016 model estimated without the inclusion of fixed effects in the second-stage regression, indicates that macro factors alone have significant explanatory power. However, systemic differences across banks in the level of the loss rates also play an important role in explaining the data. In 2016, a slightly larger share of the variation in retail loss rates is explained with fixed effects, and, for the corporate portfolio, the model fit is significantly better in 2014.
Model performance
Approach To assess the predictive power of the 2014 and 2016 models, we follow Philippon et al. (2017) and compare projected loan loss rates to realized loan loss rates. Information on banks' incurred loan losses is not available at the country-portfolio level. We therefore have to contrast model predictions with observed loss rates at the bank-year level, which we calculate from SNL data as annual loan loss reserves over gross loans. The sample covers the period from 2013 to 2016 and 45 banks.
15 To project loss rates based on the 2014 and the 2016 models, we first obtain actual GDP growth, inflation rates and unemployment rates for the countries in our sample from 2013 to 2016. 16 We then feed the models with these variables to obtain loss rates by bank, country and year. Finally, we use banks' exposures both from the stress tests and transparency exercises and sum losses to compute the average loss rate in year for bank as:
where represents the loan losses of bank in year derived from model ∈ {2014, 2016}. Note: The two charts in the figure plot loss rates for the years 2013 to 2016 that follow from the estimated stress test models against realized loss rates, which are proxied by banks' ratios of loan loss reserve over gross loans. Data on realized reserves and gross loans is from SNL. The left (right) panel presents loan loss rates that were projected using the 2014 (2016) model. Overall performance Figure 3 plots actual bank loan loss rates against the predicted loss rates, showing that the models have significant predictive power for observed loss rates. Of note, observed loss rates are significantly higher than projected loss rates. This is not only true for the loss rates that follow from the 2014 and the 2016 models, but also for the loss rates that the banks reported for the baseline scenario. The likely reason for this is that SNL uses a different definition of loan loss reserves and gross loans than the banks themselves. We therefore attribute the discrepancy to external factors and do not think there is a flaw in the banks' or our projections in that respect.
The difference in the levels notwithstanding, we assess the performance of the models based on several performance measures: The 2 and the sum of squared errors of a regression of realized loss rates on projected loss rates, as well as Spearman's rank correlation coefficient.
Overall differences in the performance of the models appear small as Third, the credit loss models were subject to adjustments that lowered the losses that the stress tests produced. This can most clearly be seen by comparing the numbers in column (1) with those in column ( 19 Banks project loss rates three years out in the stress tests. (1), (2), (5), (6). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses in columns (3) and (4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Bank-level analysis
In the following, we investigate the various changes in credit losses further, focusing on losses in the adverse scenario. Instead of aggregating losses, we compute counterfactual losses for each bank. Δ stands for the log change in losses of bank stemming from model changes, keeping the scenario and exposures constant. Δ denotes the log change in losses from exposure changes, keeping the scenario and the model constant. Δ represents the change in losses from changes in the adverse scenario keeping the exposures and model constant. Superscript denotes whether the elements that are kept constant are from the 2014 test or the 2016 test.
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Scenario changes We start by taking a closer look at scenario changes to investigate potential bias in scenario design, analyzing whether changes in the adverse scenario affected the credit losses of certain banks more than others.
In columns (1) and (2) 
all-in regulatory capital requirement in 2016.
21 Columns (1) and (2) indicate that there is no robust relationship between scenario changes and capital buffers. In this sense, scenarios are unbiased.
In column (3) and (4) of table 5, scenario changes Δ are regressed on exposure changes Δ . There is a positive correlation between scenario changes and exposure changes, implying that banks whose losses increased because of changes in exposures also tended to see an increase in losses from scenario changes. Therefore, changes in losses from scenario changes did not offset changes in losses from changes in exposures. Interestingly, there is a strong negative association between scenario changes and changes in the riskiness of banks' portfolios, however, as the next paragraph explains.
Column (5) and (6) show regressions of scenario changes Δ on the percent change in the ratio of banks' risk-weighted exposures to total exposures from 2013:Q4 to 2015:Q4. For the computation of a bank's risk-weight density, we divide a bank's total risk-weighted exposures for credit risk by its total credit exposures as of 2013:Q4 and 2015:Q4, respectively. The regression results suggest that changes in credit losses stemming from changes in the adverse scenario tended to reduce credit losses more for banks whose risk-weight densities increased 21 The all-in regulatory capital requirement includes Pillar 1, Pillar 2, and additional buffer requirements, for example, the buffer for Global Systemically Important Banks (GSIBs). In our view, the most likely explanation for the negative correlation is related to the fact that changes in scenarios are correlated with changes in countries' macroeconomic developments.
As discussed, EBA scenarios are designed as a shock to the baseline. Thus countries with an improved macro economy tend to be subject to a less severe adverse scenario in absolute terms. As a country's macro economy improves, banks take on more risk. Figure 4 for each jump-off point. 23 We keep the weight constant to capture changes in riskiness within portfolios independent of changes in riskiness that come from a reallocation of exposures across portfolios. (Since our model projects loss rates at the bank-country-portfolio level, changes in exposures across portfolios should not lead to changes in model parameters per se.) 
changes Δ
14 are included in the regression, the estimated effect of changes in a bank's riskweight density becomes weaker. This is because exposure changes and changes in risk-weight densities given constant exposures are negatively correlated as column (3) shows. This is also as expected. When a bank's portfolio becomes riskier, the bank reshuffles and reduces exposures so as to offset the increase in risk.
We are also interested in the relationship of model changes Δ 16 with scenarios changes.
Column (4) combined, which produces the same result. We conclude that model adjustments effectively smoothed losses for banks across the stress tests. These adjustments were independent of observable changes in the riskiness of underlying portfolios.
The analysis so far has considered the relationship between model, scenario and exposure changes at the bank-level. However, we can also conduct the same analysis at the bankcountry level. Table 7 presents results from running key regressions from table 6 on the more disaggregated data. Column (1) to (3) of table 7 confirm prior results on the predictive power of changes in risk-weight densities and scenario changes for model changes. The regression shown in column (4) includes two additional variables: a country's share in a bank's total exposures as well as an interaction term of this share with the change in losses due to scenario changes Δ 14 .
The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at a 5-percent significance level, indicating that the same percentage change in credit losses because of scenario changes led to a bigger percentage reduction in losses due to model changes when the country portfolio was more important for the bank. This is precisely the relationship one would expect to see if model changes were made with the intent to affect a bank's aggregate credit losses.
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In column (5), we test whether the relationship between scenario and model changes differs 25 We also checked whether the effect of scenario changes on model changes is bigger for home country exposures but the interaction term between a home country dummy and Δ 14 was not significant at standard significance levels.
depending on whether the change in losses because of scenario changes is negative or positive.
To this end, we create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if Δ 14 > 0 and is 0 otherwise and interact it with Δ 14 . The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant at a 10-percent level. Thus, scenario changes have a stronger association with model changes when they are positive, that is, when changes in the adverse scenario would have increased credit losses for a bank-country pair. This represents more evidence for systematic adjustments intended to contain credit losses for banks. (4) investigates whether the reduction of credit losses through model changes is particularly strong for larger portfolios. Exp. share stands for the share of country in total exposures of bank . Column (5) test for asymmetric effects of negative and positive changes in losses from scenario changes. Dummy takes a value of 1 if Δ 14 > 0 and 0 otherwise. RWD is computed as the percent change in the ratio of risk-weighted exposures over total exposures of bank and in country from 2013:Q4 to 2015:Q4. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
To understand how quantitatively relevant model changes between the stress tests are, we calculate the difference (m16/s16/e16-m14/s16/e16) for each bank as a ratio of its end-2015 CET1 capital. On average, the decrease in losses that came from model changes was 2.8 percent of a bank's CET1 capital in the adverse scenario. Taking out the portion of changes in losses from model changes that can be attributed to changes in risk, model changes reduced losses for banks by an average of 1.7 percent of their CET1 capital in the adverse scenario.
This number masks significant heterogeneity across banks, however. For the 10 banks with the largest reduction in credit losses from model changes (taking out the portion explained by model changes), the average reduction in credit losses was 15 percent of CET1 capital, which is economically significant.
Model Changes: Digging Deeper
This section further examines model changes, documenting two factors that might have facilitated banks' model changes. First, banks that had a larger incentive to lower losses through model changes were those with more model flexibility because a larger portion of their exposures is subject to the IRB approach. Second, these banks' models performed better (more realistically)-that is, they underestimated loan loss rates by less-likely giving these banks more room to game projected loss rates amid less supervisory scrutiny.
The role of the IRB approach and model performance
Previously, we showed that scenario changes were independent of bank capital buffers. However, the increase in losses from scenario changes was larger for banks with a larger share of exposures subject to the IRB approach. Banks that use the IRB approach run their own quantitative models to estimate the probability of default, exposure at default, and loss given default (and these feed into risk weight calculations). Banks using the Standardized Approach (STA), in contrast, employ ratings from external credit rating agencies to quantify these objects, which leaves less room for maneuver. In column (1) 14 is plotted against the average difference between loss rates projected using the 2014 model and observed loss rates for the period from 2013 to 2016. Scenario changes in this chart were computed as percent changes rather than log changes.
Model performance is judged using the methodology described in section 4.3. In column (2) of table 8, Δ 14 is regressed on the average difference between projected loan loss rates and observed loan loss rates resulting from the 2014 model and denoted by MP 14 (also plotted in the left panel of figure 7 ). Note that this differences is negative in the data. The corresponding coefficient is positive and significant, suggesting that banks whose models under-predicted loan loss rates more saw a smaller increase in losses from scenario changes. The right panel of figure   6 confirms this relationship. Thus banks with the largest incentives to change models and decrease credit losses were those whose models performed better and under-predicted loss rates by less. As a result, these banks may have had more room to produce models that generate lower losses.
To study the role that the IRB approach and model performance have in explaining model changes, we next regress model changes on these factors. Columns (4) to (7) of table 8 present the results. Column (4) shows that banks with a higher share of exposures subject to the IRB approach indeed had model changes that resulted in a larger reduction in losses controlling for changes in a bank's risk-weight density under constant exposures. Column (5) indicates that also banks whose models under-predicted realized loss rates by less saw a larger decline in losses from model changes. Column (7) includes both factors in the regression together with risk-weight density changes, scenario and exposure changes. While the coefficients associated with banks' share of IRB exposures and model performance are not significant at the 10 percent level, the 2 increases to 40 percent when these variables are included, up from 37.5 percent , the share of a bank's exposures subject to the internal risk based approach, and its model performance (columns 1-3). It also investigates whether these two latter factors can explain the change in losses coming from model changes (columns 4-7). Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns (1) to (5). Boostrapped standard errors in parentheses in columns (6) and (7). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
in column (6), indicating that they are somewhat relevant in explaining model changes even after controlling for banks' incentive to adjust models and changes in the risk of underlying portfolios.
27 At the same time, the regression shows that model changes remain strongly related to scenario changes even when controlling for the scope of improvements in model performance.
A closer look at changes in model performance
In a final step in this section, we study how model changes affected model performance by bank. As discussed in section 4.3, the overall performance of the models in explaining realized loss rates remained very similar across stress tests.
The left panel of figure 7 plots the average difference between projected loan loss rates and observed loan loss rates resulting from the 2014 model against the same difference following from the 2016 model by bank. Two facts emerge. First, there are substantial differences in model performance across banks. 28 Second, the performance of the models was relatively stable 27 The increase in the 2 is stronger in table 11 where we repeat the regressions with Δ 14 as the dependent variable.
28 This fact can also been from figure 6. To sum up, systematic model changes that effectively lowered credit losses were helped by several factors. First, banks who would have seen the strongest increase in losses had the biggest flexibility in modeling credit risk. Second, they had better models, meaning that their models 29 The change in the average model error was computed as the average difference in percent between projected loss rates resulting from the 2014 model and realized loss rates for the period from 2013 to 2016 minus the average difference in percent between projected loss rates using the 2016 model and realized loss rates over the same time period. The regression of the change in the average model error between the 2014 model and the 2016 model delivers a coefficient that is significant at the 3 percent level.
may not have been under particular supervisory scrutiny. Finally, banks with weak capital buffers seem to have been under the biggest pressure to improve models. But the increase in losses from scenario changes was not correlated with capital buffers. This combination of factors can also explain why the overall performance of the credit loss models improved slightly despite systematic model adjustments. That said, we cannot discern exactly which model changes were solely done by the banks and which reflect negotiations between the banks and the supervisors. The left panel of figure 8 plots abnormal changes in stock prices against residual model changes (those that cannot be explained by changes in risk-weight densities given constant exposures). The chart suggests that bank equity investors earned higher abnormal returns the smaller the residual increase in losses from model changes was. In other words, banks that 30 The projections that are made public are approved by the supervisors that oversee the stress tests. These projections may reflect adjustments by the supervisors and, therefore, may differ from the banks original projections that follow directly from the banks' own models. In this context, Colliard (forthcoming) argues that even when risk models are audited by supervisors, models can be biased in equilibrium.
31 Each bank's log change in the stock price and CDS spread is regressed on an EU-wide index for a 120-day window before the publication of the results. The residuals of these regressions are the abnormal price changes. Bank stocks are regressed on the Eurostoxx50 index, CDS spreads on the Itraxx Europe index. 32 We use 2016 exposures and scenarios to compute the change in losses from model changes for this exercise (Δ 16 ) because this change corresponds to the effective change in losses, relevant for the 2016 stress test results. 33 We exclude one outlier from the regressions shown in table 9, which reduces the number of banks to 32. Columns (4) through (7) repeat the exercise for abnormal changes in CDS spreads. The regression shown in column (7) includes additionally an interaction term between model changes and bank capital buffers. Once the response of CDS spreads to model changes is allowed to differ by bank capitalization, coefficients associated with model changes turn significant at a 12-percent level with slightly higher significance of the interaction term. Based on the coefficients in column (7), a bank with a 30 percent capital buffer would see an increase in its CDS spread by 9 basis points in response to a 10 percentage fall in credit losses. The negative coefficient associated with model changes together with the positive coefficient on the interaction term suggests that banks with lower losses, because of model changes, experienced an increase in CDS spreads, while effects were weaker for banks with stronger capital buffers.
What do these results imply? As discussed in Section 3, the supervisors made it clear that 2016 stress test results would be used to determine banks' capital requirements for 2017.
Lower capital requirements are good news for stock holders because they imply that banks have more room to pay dividends and may not have to raise fresh capital, so that dilution risk for existing stock holders goes down. In contrast, lower capital requirements are bad news for bond holders, because there is less capital to absorb losses in the event of solvency problems at banks.
With an increase in the probability that bond holders are not paid, CDS spreads should rise.
The regression results are in line with this interpretation: Stock prices increased more with a stronger reduction in losses from model changes, while CDS spreads also increased. If the decrease in model changes had been perceived as only reflective of actual changes in risk, then we should have seen the opposite response of stock prices since a decrease in risk is typically bad for stock holders but good for bond holders. Thus, the responses of stock prices and CDS spreads to model changes are entirely consistent with strategic model adjustments that were not driven by changes in the riskiness of banks' loan portfolios and came as a surprise to investors. (1) to (3) is the cumulative abnormal stock return on August 1 and 2, 2017. The dependent variable in columns (4) to (7) is the corresponding cumulative abnormal change in CDS spreads. Δ 16 × cap buf represents an interaction term between model changes and a bank's capital buffer defined as the difference between its fully-loaded CET1 ratio and its all-in capital requirements. Δ is the total change in credit losses between stress test editions. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Conclusions
Microprudential stress tests are designed to evaluate the capital adequacy of banks. Approaches across countries differ significantly, both in terms of who runs the stress tests and how the results are used. In the European Union, banks are allowed to build and run their own models to produce capital figures under stress. In line with papers in the literature on gaming risk weights, this paper suggests that the flexibility that exists in the design and use of banks' own models is systematically exploited to minimize projected losses in stress tests.
34 While banks' own models may be, in principle, best suited to assess the intrinsic credit risk on bank balance sheets, our results imply that the manipulation of projections cannot be excluded where the test results determine the prospects for capital distribution to investors. Stress test setups that leave little room for tailoring models to individual banks-for example, the top-down approach that the Federal Reserve chose for the CCAR-are less prone to this issue and can prevent banks from modeling their stress away.
34 See, for example, Plosser and Santos (2014) , Behn et al. (2016) , and Acharya et al. (2014) . (1) and (2). Bootstrapped standard errors in the other columns. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
